Before treating the division of principles (tattvabheda) at the beginning of the tenth chapter of the Tantrāloka (and also in other works), Abhinavagupta analyzes the concept of vedyatā (lit. ‘knowability’), the fact that a thing can be perceived, and refutes the theories of some of his opponents.  Abhinavagupta’s discourse is quite complex and he develops his argument, through a series of objections and answers, in nearly 80 stanzas. The commentary by Jayaratha is detailed and of considerable use in bringing this subject into focus (ed. KSTS, vol. VII, pp. 13-75). Notwithstanding this, many things remain obscure and a more in-depth analysis of the “debate” and of some key passages is necessary.

 Abhinavagupta does not refer to his opponents by name – Jayaratha is more explicit in this regard – but they are clearly identifiable as the exponents of the principal Mīmāṃsa traditions. Regarding knowability, these exponents believe that 1) knowability is a property of the object (viṣayadharma) distinct from the knowing subject, or 2) that it is a property of knowledge.

 Abhinavagupta shows that their positions would unavoidably give rise to a series of contradictions. At the same time, he demonstrates through a prasaṅgaviparyaya that only by accepting that the knowable and knower are a single reality, which is one of the pillars of his interpretation of Śaiva scriptures, is it possible to reconcile the conflicting theories and thus – though not stated in the text – to defend them from criticism stemming from different viewpoints.